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Abstract
A decision-maker relies on information of parties affected by her deci-
sion. These parties try to influence her decision by selective disclosure
of facts. As is well known from the literature, competition between
the informed parties constrains their ability to manipulate informa-
tion. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to com-
municate. Our parties trade off their reporting cost against the effect
on the decision. Some information is never revealed. In contrast to
set-ups without communication costs, our decision-maker can benefit
by ex-ante committing to an ex-post suboptimal decision rule. More-
over, committing ex-ante not to listen to one of the parties may also
be beneficial for the decision-maker.
Keywords: disclosure, persuasion, active judging, adversarial, inquisi-
torial
JEL: D82, K41
∗We thank Sourav Bhattachareya, Andrew Daughety, Navin Kartik, Marc Möller,
Kathryn Spier, and two referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Universität Bern, CEPR, Swiss Competition Commission, winand.emons@
vwi.unibe.ch.
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1 Introduction
Decision-makers must frequently rely on the information of parties who are
affected by their decisions. Being interested, these parties will try to manipu-
late the decision-maker’s choice by, say, concealing facts or providing selective
information. One possibility to counteract such manipulations is to solicit
advice from parties with conflicting interests. Any piece of information will
tend to favor one party or the other. Therefore, competition between the
parties constrains their ability to selectively disclose facts, which, in turn,
allows more appropriate decisions to be made.1 Typically, this literature
assumes that the interested parties incur no costs for making their reports.
By contrast, we look at the case where the interested parties bear a cost
to communicate their information: conveying the facts intelligibly takes time
and effort. Examples abound: A detailed report in written form may be
necessary to convince the adjudicator; in a trial a party may have to testify
in person in the courtroom. In both these examples there is an implicit
opportunity cost of preparing and communicating the information. The cost
can also be an explicit one. In a malpractice suit the facts may have to be
certified by an independent physician. In a products liability case the true
state may have to be validated by a neutral lab. An external auditor may have
to confirm the statements in a financial dispute. In a patent infringement
proceeding an expert may have to substantiate the claims.
With a cost to communicate the parties trade off their reporting cost
against the effect on the decision. In equilibrium they never reveal all in-
formation. In contrast to previous literature, the decision-maker can benefit
by ex-ante committing to an ex-post suboptimal decision rule. Moreover,
committing ex-ante not to listen to one of the parties may be beneficial for
the decision-maker.
Specifically, we consider the interaction between competitive advocacy
1See Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Lipman and Seppi (1995), and Gentzkov and Ka-
menica (2017). At the end of the section we review the literature related to our paper.
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and reporting costs in a simple persuasion game. Two informed parties
(experts, litigants, managers) with opposed interests can influence a decision-
maker (adjudicator, judge, CEO). The principal must take a decision in a
bounded continuous action space. Her payoff from the decision depends on
the underlying state which is unknown to her: she wants to match the true
state as closely as possible. The parties are informed about the state. They
have conflicting preferences over the principal’s decision. They can submit
verifiable information disclosing the true state, thereby carrying the decision.
Nevertheless, they incur a reporting cost when they do so. The informed
parties, therefore, trade off their cost of reporting against the effect on the
principal’s decision. As a result, some facts are never disclosed.
Within this framework we study two different procedures. First, we ana-
lyze unconstrained competition between the interested parties. The parties
simultaneously decide whether they disclose the true state or not. The ad-
judicator is completely passive; once the parties have played, she updates
her beliefs and makes a decision. This benchmark set-up is motivated by the
adversarial procedure in civil litigation of common law countries.2 Moreover,
it is the framework usually discussed in the persuasion game literature on
advocacy.
In the next procedure we endow the arbiter with the possibility to in-
terfere, which we refer to as active adjudication. In its strong form, the
adjudicator can commit to a decision in case of no reports. In its weak form,
the adjudicator can bar one of the parties from the influence game by an-
nouncing beforehand that she will not hear the party or read his report.3 In
2Under the adversary system “it is for the parties to determine not only the issues
which the court is to decide, but also the material on which the decision will be based.
The evidence presented to the court will be that which the parties choose to present
and none other. The judge may not require that a particular witness be summoned to
give evidence or that a particular document be produced; he may not even question the
witnesses himself except for the purpose of clarifying some doubt as to the meaning of
what a witness has said under examination by counsel,” Jolowicz (2000, p. 28).
3In the inquisitorial procedure of civil law countries, “it is for the judge to examine
the witnesses, if any, it is for the judge to decide whether to summon the parties for
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this set-up the principal cannot commit to a decision that is not ex post op-
timal given her beliefs and the parties’ strategies at equilibrium. Barring one
sender creates, however, a crude form of commitment. It puts the onus or
burden of proof on the other party to provide information. If this party opts
to be silent, the sequentially rational decision will tend to favor the barred
sender.
Next we identify circumstances when “active adjudication” may be benefi-
cial compared to “passive adjudication” where the principal merely updates
her beliefs and decides once the parties have played. Active adjudication
obviously has no useful role if the informed parties can report at no cost.
Indeed, with zero reporting cost competition between opposed parties plays
no useful role either: the decision-maker’s skeptical posture by assuming the
worst induces full unraveling even from a single sender (Grossman and Hart
1980, Grossman 1981, and Milgrom 1981).4
The unraveling argument is well known to fail, however, if the sender
may have no hard information (Dye 1985, Shavell 1989, and Shin 1994a). In
this case competition between multiple senders is useful (Shin 1994b, 1998).
Within this framework of zero reporting costs and the possibility of no hard
information, Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013) show that all facts are dis-
closed with positive probability and that the decision-maker gains nothing
from the ability to commit to a default decision in case of no report.5 If com-
interrogation and it is the judge who acts to obtain the assistance of an expert when
required,” Jolowicz (2000, p. 220). Our weak form of active adjudication is only one of
the multiple instruments an inquisitorial judge has at hand.
4Mathis (2008) provides necessary and sufficient conditions, with respect to preferences
and available messages, for full unraveling in one-sender games.
5The irrelevance of commitment is representative of a family of equivalence results
between optimal mechanisms and equilibria in one-sender persuasion games; see Glazer
and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), Sher (2011), and Hart et al. (2017). In the mechanism-design
approach, the decision-maker moves first and commits to decision rules. The equivalence
results state that she does as well when she moves second and plays a sequentially rational
strategy. Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013) and Bhattacharya et al. (2018) show that
the result extends to multiple senders, provided they have extreme agendas (either the
same extreme agenda or diametrically opposed agendas).
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mitment capacity has no value, actively barring one of the informed parties
has no value either.
We show that these results need not hold with positive reporting costs.
When communicating is costly, there are states of nature that are never
disclosed by the parties. Under passive adjudication, these undisclosed states
may be ex ante very likely. For example, when the arbiter has symmetrical
and strictly unimodal priors over the state space and the informed parties
have identical reporting costs, in the unique equilibrium undisclosed states
are concentrated in the middle of the probability distribution. By committing
to an extreme decision in case of no report or by barring one party from the
persuasion game, the adjudicator shifts the burden of proof solely on one
party. This moves the no-disclosure set to more extreme states which are
ex ante unlikely and, therefore, matter less for appropriate decision-making.
Alternatively, it may be that this increases the probability that one party
reports by an extent that more than offsets the loss from the other party’s
report. In our set-up the adjudicator usually does better if she is able to
commit ex ante to a decision given no report that is not sequentially rational.
Barring one sender allows for a crude form of commitment that may help the
adjudicator reach a better outcome.
The literature on reporting costs is relatively scant. It is well known from
one-sender persuasion games that unraveling also depends on the assumption
of costless disclosure. Costly disclosure typically yields “partial unraveling;”
see Jovanovic (1982), Verrechia (1983), Shavell (1989), or Cheong and Kim
(2004). We extend these results to a persuasion game with two opposed
senders. More distantly related papers with reporting costs include Eső and
Galambos (2013) who consider a cheap-talk game à la Crawford and Sobel
(1982) where the sender also has the opportunity to disclose hard informa-
tion. If disclosure is not too costly, the intervals of babbling types who do
not separate shrink due to partial unraveling. Hedlund (2015) considers a
persuasion game where the sender’s communication costs are a continuous
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function of the message’s observable precision, defined as the length of the
interval containing the true state. Upon receiving a message the uninformed
party gets information about the true state and about the communication
cost incurred by the sender. Despite communication costs, there are fully
revealing separating equilibria involving a combination of disclosure and sig-
naling. Kartik et al. (2017) consider the disclosure of hard signals when
multiple senders incur no reporting costs but must invest in information
acquisition. When senders have the same agenda, the parties’ efforts in ac-
quiring information are strategic substitutes. The decision-maker may do
better by soliciting advice from only one of them. They provide an example
where the same result holds when the two informed parties have opposed
preferences.6
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents our basic set-up which, ab-
stracting from reporting costs, borrows much from Bhattacharya and Mukher-
jee (2013). Section 3 characterizes the equilibria under passive and active ad-
judication. Section 4 discusses circumstances where active strategies may be
beneficial for the adjudicator. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
2 Model
There are two informed parties, A and B, and an uninformed decision-maker
J who will be referred to as the adjudicator. The true state of the world
is x ∈ [0, 1]. It is distributed according to the cdf F (x) with full support
on [0, 1]; f(x) denotes the probability density function. The adjudicator’s
6Hay and Spier (1997) analyze the allocation of the burden of proof between plaintiff
and defendant from the point of view of minimizing litigation costs. Because each party’s
submission cost is less than the stake, the trial outcome is always without error. However,
litigation expenditures will differ depending on the burden of proof assignment. More
distantly related strands of literature deal with costly acquisition of information by the
senders or with communication through “fabricated evidence”. See, e.g., Dewatripont and
Tirole (1999), Gerardi and Yariv (2008), and Kim (2014) on the first issue; Kartik (2009)
and Emons and Fluet (2009, 2019) on the second.
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priors, as defined by F , are her beliefs given the information available before
the informed parties take their actions.
The adjudicator must take an action y ∈ [0, 1] which yields her a payoff
uJ(y, x) that depends on the underlying state. The payoff is expressed in
terms of a symmetric loss function, uJ(y, x) = − v(|y − x|) where v(0) =
v′(0) = 0, v′ > 0 and v′′ > 0. The payoff is thus maximal when the decision
matches the true state.
The parties A and B are concerned about the adjudicator’s decision.
They have state-independent utilities. Party i ’s utility from the adjudicator’s
decision is ui(y) with uA(y) = − y and uB(y) = y. Party A wants the decision
to be as small as possible, equivalently as much to the left as possible; party
B wants the decision to be as large or as much to the right as possible.7
Knowing the true state, they may report it to the adjudicator: either
they provide hard information about the state or they communicate nothing.
Formally, they send the message mi ∈ {x, ∅}; mi = x means disclosure of the
true state and mi = ∅ denotes silence. Total payoff to an informed party is
Ui(y,mi) = ui(y)− Ci(mi), i = A,B,
where
Ci(mi) =
{
0, if mi = ∅,
ci, if mi = x,
is the cost to the party of sending the message mi with ci ≥ 0. Obviously,
it could be that reporting costs are so high that both parties always remain
silent. To rule out this possibility, we assume cA + cB < 1. The parties’
reporting costs are common knowledge.
7Sher’s (2011) condition for the irrelevance of commitment in one-sender games is that
the decision-maker’s utility function is a concave transformation of the sender’s utility func-
tion. This is satisfied here with respect to both senders with uJ(y, x) = −v (|uA(y) + x|) =
−v (|uB(y)− x|).
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3 Equilibrium Characterization
Let us now derive the equilibria when the adjudicator has no commitment
power; her decision is always sequentially rational given her beliefs. We first
consider the benchmark where the adjudicator is completely passive. The
parties simultaneously decide whether or not to disclose the true state; once
the parties have played, the adjudicator updates her beliefs and makes a de-
cision. This benchmark is motivated by the adversarial procedure. Then we
turn to the case where, at a preliminary stage, the adjudicator can announce
that a party is barred from reporting. The adjudicator now deals only with
one sender. A judge has this possibility under the inquisitorial procedure.
Two-sender equilibrium. The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian
(PBE). A strategy for the adjudicator is a function y(mA,mB). Party i’s
strategy is a function mi(x), i = A,B.
The adjudicator’s best response is to choose y = x if one or both parties
disclose the state. If the state is not disclosed, her best response is
y∗ = arg max
y
E (uJ(y, x) | mA = mB = ∅) . (1)
The right-hand side is the adjudicator’s expected payoff from decision y given
her beliefs about x conditional on the event that both parties remain silent.
Party A wishes y to be as small as possible. It is therefore optimal for
party A to remain silent when the true state satisfies x+cA ≥ y∗. To see this,
observe that if the state is revealed by the other party, disclosure by A does
not change the decision but imposes a reporting cost; conversely, if the state
is not disclosed by the other party, A is better off with the adjudicator’s
default action y∗ than by reporting at cost cA and inducing the decision
y = x. Similarly, and recalling that B wishes y to be as large as possible, it
is an optimal strategy for party B to remain silent when the true state and
his reporting cost satisfy x− cB ≤ y∗.
Conversely, it is an optimal strategy for party A to report if x+ cA < y
∗
because A knows that, given the state x, the other party will not report.
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Similarly, it is optimal for B to report if x−cB > y∗. Given the adjudicator’s
default action when she gets no reports, the no-disclosure event is therefore
N(y∗) = {x : y∗ − cA ≤ x ≤ y∗ + cB, x ∈ [0, 1]}. (2)
Condition (1) can be rewritten as
y∗ = arg max
y
E (uJ(y, x) | N(y∗)) . (3)
An equilibrium is completely characterized by a solution y∗ to (3).
Proposition 1: A PBE for the two-sender game with passive adjudicator
always exists. In any equilibrium y∗ ∈ (0, 1). The informed parties’ strategies
are
mA(x) =
{
x, if x+ cA < y
∗,
∅, otherwise, (4)
mB(x) =
{
x, if x− cB > y∗,
∅, otherwise. (5)
The adjudicator’s strategy is
y(mA,mB) =
{
x, if mA = x or mB = x,
y∗, otherwise,
(6)
where
y∗ = arg max
y
∫ min(y∗+cB ,1)
max(0,y∗−cA)
uJ(y, x)f(x) dx. (7)
Note that the right-hand side of (7) is not a conditional expectation.
However, condition (7) is equivalent to
y∗ = arg max
y
∫ min(y∗+cB ,1)
max(0,y∗−cA)
uJ(y, x)f(x) dx
/
Pr(N(y∗))
= arg max
y
E (uJ(y, x) | N(y∗)) .
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Because y∗ ∈ (0, 1), it also follows that it satisfies the first-order condition∫ min(y∗+cB ,1)
max(0,y∗−cA)
u′J(y
∗, x)f(x) dx = 0 (8)
with u′J(y, x) := ∂uJ(y, x)/∂y.
Qualitatively, the equilibrium is similar to the equilibrium in Bhattacharya
and Mukherjee (2013). The crucial difference is that there is a wedge between
the experts’ disclosure sets in our model, meaning that some states are never
disclosed. By contrast, in the set-up of Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013),
all states are disclosed with positive probability.
It is useful to make a distinction between an interior and a corner equi-
librium. An equilibrium is interior if both parties disclose with positive
probability. In a corner equilibrium only one party discloses with positive
probability, the other party is always silent. An outcome is referred to as a
corner-i equilibrium if only party i is active.
Corollary 1: In the game with passive adjudicator, at least one party dis-
closes with positive probability.
In an equilibrium with y∗ as the adjudicator’s default action, both parties
remain silent for states in
S := [y∗ − cA, y∗ + cB] ∩ [0, 1].
We refer to S as the no-disclosure set. In an interior equilibrium, S is in
the interior of the state space as illustrated in Figure 1a. Both parties then
report with positive probability. Figure 1b illustrates a corner-A equilibrium.
The no-disclosure set is now of the form [y∗− cA, 1]. Party B is always silent
because x− cB < y∗ for all x in the state space. Let L denote the length of
the no-disclosure set. Observe that in an interior equilibrium, L = cA + cB.
In a corner equilibrium, L ≤ cA + cB.
In a corner-A equilibrium, condition (7) reduces to
y∗ = arg max
y
∫ 1
y∗−cA
uJ(y, x)f(x) dx. (9)
9
This condition is equivalent to
y∗ = arg max
y
∫ 1
y∗−cA
uJ(y, x)
(
f(x)
1− F (y∗ − cA)
)
f(x) dx
= arg max
y
E (uJ(y, x)) | x > y∗ − cA) .
One-sender equilibrium. As we show in the next section, competi-
tion between the informed parties to influence the adjudicator may not be
desirable from her point of view. She may prefer not to be influenced by a
party by refusing to listen to him. We modify the original game by adding
an initial stage where the adjudicator announces whether she listens to both
parties or whether one party is barred from reporting (this would specify
which one). In the latter case, the continuation game that ensues is referred
to as a one-sender game.
𝑦𝑦∗ − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 10 𝑦𝑦∗
𝑥𝑥
no disclosure
interior equilibrium
𝑦𝑦∗ − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 10 𝑦𝑦∗
𝑥𝑥
no disclosure
corner-A equilibrium
a)
b)
𝑦𝑦∗ + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵
Fig. 1. Interior and corner equilibria
Proposition 2: A PBE for the one-sender game always exists. If only A is
allowed to report, A’s strategy is given by (4) and the adjudicator’s strategy
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is
y(mA) =
{
x, if mA = x,
y∗, otherwise,
(10)
where
y∗ = arg max
y
∫ 1
max(0,y∗−cA)
uJ(y, x)f(x) dx. (11)
If only B is allowed to report, B’s strategy is given by (5) and the adjudica-
tor’s strategy is
y(mB) =
{
x, if mB = x,
y∗, otherwise,
(12)
where
y∗ = arg max
y
∫ min(y∗+cB ,1)
0
uJ(y, x)f(x) dx. (13)
In either case y∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Allowing only one party to report forces a corner equilibrium. When only
A is allowed, large values of x will never be reported but smaller values (those
satisfying x < y∗ − cA) will be disclosed. Conversely, if B is the only one to
report, small values of x will never be disclosed.
There is a distinction between one-sender and two-sender corner equi-
libria. The outcome, by force a corner equilibrium, of the one-sender game
where only i can report need not be an equilibrium of the two-sender game.
The reason is that competition between the informed parties may induce an
interior equilibrium or the opposite corner equilibrium.
Corollary 2: If the two-sender game has a corner-i equilibrium with default
decision y∗, then the latter is also an equilibrium default in the one-sender
game where only i is allowed to report. An equilibrium strategy profile of the
one-sender game need not be part of an equilibrium strategy profile of the
two-sender game.
In a two-sender equilibrium L ≤ cA + cB: in an interior equilibrium the
equality holds and in a corner equilibrium the weak inequality holds. In a
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one-sender equilibrium L ≤ cA + cB if it is part of the equilibrium strategy
profile of the two-sender game; if it is not part thereof, then L > cA + cB.
This implies the following: If the arbiter forces a corner equilibrium that is
not part of an equilibrium of the two-sender game, she increases the length
of the no-disclosure set. She also changes, however, its location. Therefore,
barring a sender creates a trade-off between the size and the location of
the no-disclosure set. Or, put differently: The virtue of competition is to
limit the length of the no-disclosure set to L ≤ cA + cB. The problem of
competition may be, however, the location of the no-disclosure set.
To conclude this section let us discuss the possibility of multiple equi-
libria. It is well-established that disclosure costs may lead to multiple equi-
libria in one-sender persuasion games. In games where the single sender
wants the adjudicator’s decision to be as large as possible, equivalent here
to a sender-B game, log-concavity of the density f or of the cdf F ensures
a unique equilibrium; see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).8 The former con-
dition also guarantees a unique equilibrium in a sender-A game, i.e., when
the single sender wants the adjudicator’s decision to be as small as possible.9
Nevertheless, in the two-sender game the log-concavity condition does not
eliminate the possibility of multiple-equilibria . We provide examples in Sec-
tion 4. When multiple equilibria arise, we select the adjudicator-preferred
equilibrium, henceforth referred to simply as the equilibrium.
4 Active versus Passive Adjudication
We now compare the arbiter’s payoff under passive adjudication and two
forms of active adjudication. Passive adjudication refers to the two-sender
equilibria described in the preceding section. The parties decide whether they
8Log-concavity of f implies log-concavity of F and is therefore a stronger condition.
9A log-concave f implies that the hazard rate f(x)/(1 − F (x)) is increasing. This
ensures uniqueness in the sender-A game. The proof is similar to the argument in Bagnoli
and Bergstrom (2005).
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submit a report and the arbiter’s decision is sequentially rational given the
parties’ submissions. Under the first form of active adjudication, the arbiter
can fully commit to a default decision in case of no reports. We show that this
is often strictly beneficial from the arbiter’s point of view. Under the second
form of active adjudication, the arbiter can only commit not to hear a party
or read his report, i.e., the arbiter can discard a party from the persuasion
game but her decision is sequentially rational given the remaining party’s
report. Her payoff is the same as in the one-sender equilibria described in
the preceding section. We show that this form of active adjudication can also
be beneficial.
Commitment to a default decision. If the adjudicator has full com-
mitment capacity, she announces the default action ŷ maximizing
UJ(ŷ) =
∫ min(ŷ+cB ,1)
max(0,ŷ−cA)
uJ(ŷ, x)f(x) dx. (14)
The parties’ strategies are as described in Proposition 1 with ŷ substituted
for y∗.
If the problem has an interior solution ŷ ∈ (0, 1), it satisfies the first-order
condition U
′
J(ŷ) = 0 where
U
′
J(ŷ) =
∫ min(ŷ+cB ,1)
max(0,ŷ−cA)
u′J(ŷ, x)f(x) dx
+ uJ(ŷ,min(ŷ + cB, 1))f(min(ŷ + cB, 1))
dmin(ŷ + cB, 1)
dŷ
− uJ(ŷ,max(0, ŷ − cA))f(max(0, ŷ − cA))
dmax(0, ŷ − cA)
dŷ
. (15)
Evaluated at ŷ = y∗, where y∗ is the equilibrium default decision in the
two-sender game without commitment capacity, the first term in (15) is equal
to zero; recall condition (8). Yet, the sum of the last two terms will in general
differ from zero, implying that the adjudicator benefits from being able to
commit to an action that differs from the ex post optimal decision.
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Moreover, a default action satisfying U
′
J(ŷ) = 0 need not be the solution
under commitment because the maximization problem is typically not con-
cave. In particular, the solution may be the corner solution ŷ = 0 or ŷ = 1
implying that only one party is induced to report. Even when the optimal ŷ
is interior and satisfies (15), it may also induce disclosure by only one party.
When ŷ ≤ cA, only B reports. When ŷ ≥ 1 − cB, only A reports. Solu-
tions satisfying ŷ /∈ (cA, 1− cB) will be referred to as one-sender outcomes.10
Such outcomes are of particular interest because commitment can be shown
to be strictly beneficial as compared to passive adjudication. Furthermore,
a one-sender outcome amounts to discarding one party, although this is ac-
complished here through the default decision under commitment. Note that
in a one-sender outcome the length of the no-disclosure set L < cA + cB.
We now provide sufficient conditions for commitment to be beneficial as
compared to passive adjudication. Throughout we assume that the density
f is continuous and focus on the case where it is unimodal. This includes
the case where f has a modal interval [ml,mh], i.e., f(x) is maximized at
all x in this interval. When ml = mh := m, the density is strictly unimodal
with the unique mode m. There are two possibilities to consider. Either the
modal interval is at one of the boundaries of the state space or it is interior,
i.e., 0 < ml ≤ mh < 1.
Proposition 3: Commitment is strictly beneficial if it yields a one-sender
outcome. When f is unimodal, any of the following conditions is sufficient
for a one-sender outcome:
(i) f is monotonic;
(ii) f is symmetric and cA + cB ≤ 12 ;
(iii) f has an interior modal interval [ml,mh] and cA + cB ≤ mh −ml;
10To clarify our jargon: If under commitment only one agent reports, we call it a one-
sender outcome. Without commitment, when only one party sends a message, be it in the
game where both or only one party is allowed to report, we speak of a corner equilibrium.
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(iv) f(x) is concave over the interval [m− cA− cB,m+ cA + cB]∩ [0, 1], for
any mode m.
The first claim in the proposition follows from the fact that the optimal
default in a one-sender outcome under commitment necessarily differs from
the equilibrium default without commitment (whether an interior or a cor-
ner equilibrium). To decipher condition (iv), suppose the density is strictly
unimodal with mode m. If f is smooth, it must be concave in some neigh-
borhood of m. The condition then holds if cA and cB are not too large. To
give a second illustration, the condition also holds, without additional qual-
ifications, if f is concave over the state space, e.g., as with the triangular
and trapezoidal distributions. We provide examples further illustrating the
one-sender outcomes.
Example 1: f is decreasing.
Borrowing from the proof of part (i) of Proposition 3, the adjudicator
chooses ŷ = 1 if cA ≤ cB or if cA−cB is positive and not too large; otherwise,
she chooses some ŷ ≤ cA. In other words, the adjudicator trades off the
size of the no-disclosure set which determines the error costs v(|ŷ − x|) and
the location of this set which determines the probability of the error costs.
Setting ŷ = 1 yields the one-sender outcome where only A reports. The
no-disclosure set is then [1 − cA, 1]. When f is strictly decreasing, this set
belongs to the region of the state space with the smallest density. However,
when cA becomes large, the error cost will also become large: the more so
the more convex the function v. At some point, it is better to switch to the
opposite one-sender solution where only B reports. The adjudicator then
chooses some positive ŷ less than cA.
11 With a strictly decreasing f , this
allows the more severe errors to arise with smaller probability than if she
picks ŷ = 0. The B-sender solution is better because the no-disclosure set
11With a strictly decreasing f , condition (19) in the proof implies U
′
J(0) > 0, so ŷ = 0
cannot be optimal.
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[0, ŷ + cB] is smaller than the no-disclosure set [1 − cA, 1]. Note that ŷ = 1
or ŷ ∈ (0, cA] are not sequentially rational.
Example 2: f has a unique interior mode m ≤ 1
2
and cA + cB is not too
large.
We now always have a corner solution ŷ = 0 or ŷ = 1, but the adjudicator
may again need to trade off the location of the no-disclosure set against its
size. Sufficient conditions for ŷ = 1 are cA ≤ cB and f(z) ≥ f(1 − z)
for z ∈ [0, cA]. However, with a symmetric density, including the uniform
distribution as a limiting case, the adjudicator simply picks the one-sender
outcome where the lower-cost sender reports.
To summarize, under appropriate conditions the optimal policy under
commitment puts the burden of proof fully on one party. Either only unlikely
states remain undisclosed or the size of the no-disclosure set is small because
the reporting party has lower costs. It remains to give some intuition for why
the adjudicator would ever want to choose a two-sender outcome. This can
arise when reporting costs are sufficiently large.
Example 3: an optimal two-sender outcome under commitment.
Let the density be symmetric so that the mode m = 1/2. Reporting
costs are also symmetric and equal to c. Candidates for a solution are ŷ = 0,
ŷ = 1, or possibly ŷ = 1/2. Let f be increasing and convex for x < 1/2 and
decreasing and convex for x > 1/2. The density function has a spike at the
mode, hence condition (iv) does not hold. For c sufficiently large, condition
(ii) will not hold either. Then, for c large, f(c) = f(1 − c) will be ‘large’
while f(1/2− c) = f(1/2 + c) will be ‘small’. With ŷ = 1/2, large errors, i.e.,
those close to 1/2± c will occur with small probability; with ŷ = 0 or ŷ = 1,
large errors, i.e., those close to c or 1− c will have large probability. With a
sufficiently convex error cost function, the two-sender outcome with default
decision ŷ = 1/2 does better. Moreover, there is no benefit as compared
to passive adjudication because y∗ = 1/2 is the unique equilibrium of the
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two-sender game.
No-commitment. Let us now examine the case where the adjudicator
cannot commit to a default decision in case of no report. She can only
bar a sender.12 There are two possibilities for this limited form of active
adjudication to yield higher payoff for the arbiter than passive adjudication.
Either the two-sender equilibrium under passive adjudication is interior but
the adjudicator does better by allowing only one party to report. Or the
two-sender equilibrium is a corner equilibrium where one party is silent. The
adjudicator does, however, better by allowing only that silent party to report:
she prefers to force the opposite corner equilibrium.
The adjudicator’s decision must be sequentially rational. As shown in the
previous section, the optimal default under commitment is often a corner so-
lution with ŷ = 0 or ŷ = 1. In the one sender equilibrium where one party is
barred from reporting, the equilibrium default satisfies y∗ ∈ (0, 1). Accord-
ingly, no-commitment yields a worse outcome than commitment. The same
is also true when the solution under commitment is some ŷ ∈ (0, 1) yielding
a one-sender outcome. As noted, ŷ differs from the equilibrium y∗ where the
same party is the only one allowed to report. Recall that in a one-sender
outcome under commitment the length of the no-disclosure set L < cA + cB.
By contrast, it is strictly greater in a forced one-sender equilibrium. Thus,
barring a sender may not be beneficial even though commitment yields a one-
sender outcome that is better than the passive adjudication outcome. We
illustrate the preceding observations for the case of the uniform distribution.
Example 4: the case of the uniform distribution.
The uniform distribution is consistent with condition (i) of Proposition
3. Under full commitment, cA = cB = c implies ŷ = 0 or ŷ = 1. Under pas-
sive adjudication, the two-sender game has a continuum of payoff equivalent
12It is obviously never in the adjudicator’s interest to prohibit both parties from report-
ing.
17
equilibria with y∗ ∈ [c, 1 − c]. Since the loss function is symmetric and all
states are equally likely, any y∗ ∈ [c, 1− c] is an equilibrium and these equi-
libria yield the adjudicator the same payoff. Given her uniform priors, she
is indifferent as to the location of the no-disclosure interval.13 In particular,
y∗ = c and y∗ = 1 − c are corner equilibria which amount to discarding A
or B respectively. So active adjudication in the from of barring one party is
not beneficial.
Similarly, under full commitment, cA < cB implies ŷ = 1, i.e., only A re-
ports. Under passive adjudication, the two-sender game has a unique corner-
A equilibrium with y∗ = 1− cA and the no-disclosure interval is [1− 2cA, 1].
Active adjudication through barring B, therefore, yields the same outcome.
Note that barring A forces the corner-B equilibrium y∗ = cB. This is detri-
mental because the no-disclosure interval [0, 2cB] of the corner-B equilibrium
is larger than the no-disclosure interval of the corner-A equilibrium.
Consider now the case where the adjudicator has specific views concerning
the likely values of the state. Intuitively, strong priors suggest that active
adjudication may be beneficial. Suppose, for example, F is skewed with
most of the probability mass concentrated on small values of x. The two-
sender game may nevertheless have an interior equilibrium. If A’s reporting
cost is not too large, it may be beneficial to force a corner-A equilibrium by
barring B. Alternatively, suppose F is strictly unimodal and symmetric. If
the parties have the same reporting cost c, the two-sender game has a unique
interior equilibrium with y∗ = 1/2. The no-disclosure interval [1/2−c, 1/2+c]
is centered and may include most of the probability mass. It may be beneficial
to force a corner equilibrium by barring one party: although the size of the
no-disclosure set will be larger, no disclosure will occur for values of the state
that are a priori unlikely. We now provide examples for both arguments.
We illustrate with the case where the adjudicator’s priors are given by
13Note that the uniform density is log-concave, but nevertheless leads to multiple equi-
libria in the two-sender game.
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the Beta distribution B(a, b) with parameters a > 0 and b > 0. The mean
is µ = a/(a + b). The mode is m = (a − 1)/(a + b − 2) if a > 1 and b > 1;
for a < 1 and b ≥ 1, the density is everywhere decreasing so that m = 0.
See Figure 2. In all our examples, the distribution is unimodal and is either
symmetric or skewed with mean and mode less than or equal to 1/2. The
loss function is the square error. Costs are cA = .1 and cB ∈ {.1, .15, .2}. In
all cases, an adjudicator with full commitment capacity chooses ŷ = 1, i.e.,
the A-sender outcome. Accordingly, when the adjudicator cannot commit,
she will often (but not always) do better by allowing only A to report.In[4]:= PlotPDFBetaDistribution0.5`, 1, x, PDFBetaDistribution2, 5, x,
PDFBetaDistribution5, 5, x, PDFBetaDistribution20, 20, x, x, 0, 1
Out[4]=
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
2
3
4
5
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(5,5)(2,5)
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Prior density
Fig. 2. Some of the Beta distributions used in Table 1
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Table 1 about here
The first case in Table 1 is B(.5, 1) with µ = 1/3 and mode m = 0.14
When cA = cB = .1, the two-sender game has a unique corner-B equilibrium
with y∗ = .05. The adjudicator does, however, better by barring B, thus
14In Table 1 the type of equilibrium is denoted c-A for corner-A, c-B for corner-B,
and int for interior.
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forcing a corner-A equilibrium.15 When B’s cost is cB = .15, the two-sender
game has three equilibria: a corner-A, a corner-B, and an interior equilib-
rium. The best outcome from the adjudicator’s point of view is the corner-A
equilibrium. This outcome arises ‘naturally’ under our adjudicator-preferred
selection convention. Alternatively, it can be implemented by discarding B.
When B’s cost is cB = .20, the two-sender game has a unique corner-A
equilibrium. There is then no need for the principal to actively adjudicate.
For B(.5, 2), B(1, 5), and B(2, 5) a corner-A equilibrium is always the
best option for the adjudicator. The two-sender game never has a corner-A
equilibrium. Therefore, the adjudicator always has to bar B to enforce the
corner-A equilibrium.
Next consider the last two cases in Table 1 with symmetric distributions.
In all cases the two-sender game has a unique interior equilibrium which,
with one exception, is also best for the adjudicator. Only for the concen-
trated distribution B(10, 10) and cB = .2 a corner-A equilibrium is better.
The intuition is straightforward. By barring one sender, the adjudicator
has control over the location of the no-disclosure set. However, because she
cannot commit to a default decision, she has no control over the size of
this set. Consider the case where both parties have the same reporting cost
cA = cB = c = .1. In the interior equilibrium, the length of the no-disclosure
set is 2c = .2. In the corner-A equilibrium, the no disclosure set [y∗ − c, 1]
is much larger. For the more concentrated distribution, y∗ = .571 and the
length of the no-disclosure set equals .53. This yields a much larger maximum
error.
Table 2 provides additional examples with concentrated and symmetric
densities and symmetric reporting costs. We now consider small costs. For
the distribution B(10, 10), the arbiter does better with a corner equilibrium
15Due to the skewness of the distribution, the no-disclosure set of the corner-A equilib-
rium is about twice the size of the no-disclosure set of the corner-B equilibrium. Yet, the
no-disclosure states in the corner-A equilibrium are ex ante very unlikely as compared to
the corner-B equilibrium.
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if the reporting cost is reduced to c = .05 or c = .02. With the more
concentrated densities, a one-sender equilibrium remains better for the lower
reporting cost c = .02. Even though the no-disclosure set is larger than
the no-disclosure set of the interior equilibrium, silence is ex ante sufficiently
unlikely in the corner equilibria as compared to the interior ones.16
Table 2 about here
When priors are symmetric and reporting costs do not differ too much,
two-sender equilibria are interior. The larger cB, the larger y
∗: the onus to
disclose falls more heavily on the least cost party A. By contrast, when costs
are symmetric and priors sufficiently favor A, y∗ will favor A, putting the
onus to disclose on B. Thus, in our examples the asymmetries in reporting
costs and in prior beliefs move the no-disclosure set in opposite directions.
The following rough qualitative generalizations emerge:
(i) When priors are symmetric and strictly unimodal, the two-sender game
has an interior equilibrium if reporting costs do not differ much. It may be
better to discard the high cost party.
(ii) When priors are skewed against party B, strictly unimodal, and re-
porting costs do not differ much, the outcome of the two-sender game is
either an interior equilibrium or a corner equilibrium putting the onus on
the a priori disfavored party B. This implies that ex ante relatively likely
(smaller) states will not be disclosed. Discarding party B may be beneficial:
it puts the burden of proof on A, thus shifting no-disclosure to the less likely
high states.
Parties with unknown information endowment. To conclude this
section, let us discuss the possibility that the adjudicator does not observe
16In our examples, the one-sender games always have unique equilibria. Recall that
uniqueness obtains when the density f(x) is log-concave, which is the case for a ≥ 1 and
b ≥ 1.
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whether or not the parties are informed about x, as is the case in, e.g.,
Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013). Party i observes the true state with
probability pi. Under passive adjudication the equilibrium is a straightfor-
ward generalization of Proposition 1. The parties’ equilibrium strategies are
the same, except, of course, that they report nothing when uninformed. The
adjudicator’s equilibrium decision in case of no report is
y∗ = arg max
y
(1− pA)
∫ max(0,y∗−cA)
0
uJ(y, x)f(x) dx
+
∫ min(y∗+cB ,1)
max(0,y∗−cA)
uJ(y, x)f(x) dx
+ (1− pB)
∫ 1
min(y∗+cB ,1)
uJ(y, x)f(x) dx. (16)
As in our baseline set-up, there is a wedge between the parties’ disclosure sets
due to the reporting costs. However, the adjudicator now also takes the pos-
sibility into account that parties do not report because they are uninformed.
A similar formulation obtains in the case of one-sender equilibria.17
Active adjudication may again be beneficial. Consider the following ex-
ample with a uniform distribution. Party A is always informed, i.e., pA = 1,
and has reporting cost cA > 0. Party B is informed with probability pB = p
and incurs no reporting cost, i.e., cB = 0. The loss function is the square
error v(|y − x|) = (y − x)2.
Under passive adjudication, the equilibrium default decision is
y∗ =
{
1− cA/
√
1− p, if p < p0,
(
√
1− p− 1 + p)/p, if p ≥ p0,
where p0 = (1− 2cA)/(1− cA)2.
When 0 < p < p0, y
∗ > cA and we have an interior equilibrium where
both parties report with some probability. When p ≥ p0, y∗ ≤ cA and the
outcome is a corner-B equilibrium where only B reports.
17(16) combines Proposition 1 with the condition in Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013)
for the case of two opposed experts. Setting pB = 0 in (16) yields the equilibrium default
decision in the one-sender equilibrium where only A is allowed to report.
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Fig. 3. Mean-square error in the two-sender game with
uniform priors, 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 = .2, 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 = 0, 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 1, and 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = 𝑝𝑝.
Figure 3 depicts the adjudicator’s expected loss (the mean square error) as
a function of p for cA = .2. When p = 0, B never discloses and the loss is the
same as in the one-sender game where only A is allowed to report. A larger
p decreases the default decision y∗: the more likely it is that B is informed,
the more “no report” suggests a small value of x. A lower y∗, however,
reduces the probability that A reports. It turns out that the loss from this
reduction more than offsets the gain from B’s higher reporting probability.
The adjudicator’s expected loss, therefore, increases in p for p ≤ p0 = .937
where the equilibrium switches from interior to corner-B. In the corner-B
regime the expected loss is decreasing in p. As p approaches unity, y∗ tends to
zero; B always discloses so that there is complete unraveling. Computations
yield that for p < .987 the arbiter does better by barring B, thus forcing a
corner-A equilibrium, rather than adjudicating passively and implementing
an interior or a corner-B equilibrium.
An adjudicator with full commitment capacity picks ŷ = 1 except for
p sufficiently close to unity; such a policy yields a mean square error equal
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to .0027. For p sufficiently close to unity (and above .987), the optimal full
commitment default is ŷ = (
√
1− p−1+p)/p and yields a corner-B outcome.
This is the same as the equilibrium default in the corner-B equilibrium.18
5 Concluding Remarks
We have discussed a simple set-up showing that a sophisticated uninformed
principal can often do better than merely wait passively for interested com-
peting parties to decide whether or not they will provide information. When
communication is costly, the decision-maker usually does better if she is able
to commit ex-ante to a default decision in case of no report. This contrasts
with some general results on persuasion games without disclosure costs. Ac-
tive adjudication by barring one sender also often does better even though
the decision-maker has limited power, e.g., she can force no one and can-
not commit to a default decision. Nevertheless, deciding who is allowed to
take part in the persuasion game may be beneficial, compared with passive
adjudication.
Our results do not mean, of course, that competition between interested
parties is not generally useful, as in the environment studied by Milgrom and
Roberts (1986). In Lipman and Seppi (1995) for instance, the issue is whether
relatively simple strategies (e.g., “believe unless refuted”) on the part of
the decision-maker can elicit information transmission through competition.
However, our analysis shows that reporting costs introduce a wedge between
purely passive adjudication and a more active stance. A decision-maker may
wish to make clear which interested party she will listen to.
Finally, we have evaluated passive versus active adjudication solely on
the basis of error costs. A natural extension of our approach is to also take
reporting costs into account.19 If, for example, the arbiter gives a lot of
18In the corner-B equilibrium reporting costs play no role. Therefore, the optimal default
decision under commitment equals the equilibrium default decision without commitment.
19See, e.g., Emons and Fluet (2009, 2019) for such a set-up.
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weight to submission costs and little weight to errors on her part, it may be
optimal to bar both parties from reporting. Abstracting from this extreme
case, there is a natural congruence between reducing error costs and reducing
reporting costs. When barring one party from the persuasion game reduces
expected error costs, it also tends to reduce expected reporting costs.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let the parties’s strategies be as described in (4) and
(5) for some y∗. The probability of the no-disclosure event is then
Pr(N(y∗)) =
∫ min(y∗+cB ,1)
max(0,y∗−cA)
f(x) dx.
Applying Bayes’ rule, the adjudicator’s expected payoff from decision y conditional
on no disclosure is therefore
E (uJ(y, x) | N(y∗)) =
∫ min(y∗+cB ,1)
max(0,y∗−cA)
uJ(y, x)f(x) dx/Pr(N(y
∗)).
Maximizing this expression with respect to y is therefore equivalent to maximizing
the numerator. The necessary and sufficient condition is∫ min(y∗+cB ,1)
max(0,y∗−cA)
u′J(y, x)f(x) dx = 0
where u′J(y, x) := ∂uJ(y, x)/∂y. Sufficiency follows from u
′′
J(y, x) < 0.
Define
Z(y) =
∫ min(y+cB ,1)
max(0,y−cA)
u′J(y, x)f(x) dx
so that y is an equilibrium if Z(y) = 0. The function Z(y) is easily seen to be
continuous. Recall that u′J(y, x) > 0 if y < x and u
′
J(y, x) < 0 if y > x. Therefore,
Z(0) =
∫ cB
0
u′J(0, x)f(x) dx > 0.
Similarly,
Z(1) =
∫ 1
1−cA
u′J(1, x)f(x) dx < 0.
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Hence, there exists y ∈ (0, 1) such that Z(y) = 0. QED
Proof of Corollary 1. Let y∗ be the equilibrium decision under no disclosure.
A reports with some probability if y∗ > cA and B reports with some probability if
y∗ < 1− cB. At least one of these conditions hold. Suppose not. Then y∗− cA ≤ 0
and y∗ + cB ≥ 1 yielding cA + cB ≥ 1, which contradicts our assumption on
reporting costs. QED
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the one-sender continuation game where only
A is allowed to report. A’s strategy is as described in (10) for some y∗. Using the
same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, the adjudicator’s best response
when she gets no report is y satisfying∫ 1
y∗−cA
u′J(y, x)f(x) dx = 0.
Define
Z(y) =
∫ 1
max(0,y−cA)
u′J(y, x)f(x) dx (17)
so that y is an equilibrium if Z(y) = 0. Then
Z(0) =
∫ 1
0
u′J(0, x)f(x) dx > 0
and
Z(1) =
∫ 1
1−cA
u′J(1, x)f(x) dx < 0.
Hence, there exists y ∈ (0, 1) solving Z(y) = 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 3. The solution ŷ to the adjudicator’s problem under
commitment is a one sender outcome if ŷ /∈ (cA, 1− cB). Consider the case where
ŷ ≤ cA. Then ŷ maximizes
UJ(ŷ) =
∫ ŷ+cB
0
uJ(ŷ, x)f(x) dx.
If the solution is ŷ = 0, this cannot be sequentially optimal. If the solution is
interior, it satisfies the first-order condition
U
′
J(ŷ) =
∫ ŷ+cB
0
u′J(ŷ, x)f(x) dx + uJ(ŷ, ŷ + cB)f(ŷ + cB) = 0.
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Therefore, in either case, ŷ differs from an equilibrium default decision without
commitment. It follows that commitment does better. A similar argument holds
if ŷ ≥ 1− cB.
We now consider sufficient conditions for a one-sender outcome. The adjudi-
cator’s expected payoff is
UJ(ŷ) = −V (ŷ) :=
−
∫ ŷ
max(0,ŷ−cA)
v(ŷ − x)f(x) dx−
∫ min(ŷ+cB ,1)
ŷ
v(x− ŷ)f(x) dx, (18)
where V (ŷ) is the expected error cost. In what follows, we use the fact that the
derivative f ′(x) exists almost everywhere when the density is unimodal. Differen-
tiating the expected error cost with respect to ŷ and integrating by parts yields
V ′(ŷ) =

∫ ŷ+cB
0 v( |ŷ − x| )f
′(x) dx
+v(ŷ)f(0), if ŷ < cA;∫ ŷ+cB
ŷ−cA v( |ŷ − x| )f
′(x) dx, if cA≤ ŷ ≤ 1− cB;∫ 1
ŷ−cA v( |ŷ − x| )f
′(x) dx
−v(1− ŷ)f(1), if ŷ > 1− cB.
(19)
We show that ŷ ∈ (cA, 1− cB) cannot be optimal under the conditions of the propo-
sition.
(i): Let f(x) be non-increasing, i.e., f ′(x) ≤ 0. Then, from (19), V ′(ŷ) ≤ 0 for all
ŷ > cA with strict inequality for ŷ > 1− cB. The strict inequality follows because
either the density is strictly decreasing at some x > 1− cB or f(1) > 0. Hence
V (1) < V (ŷ) for ŷ > cA. Therefore, the optimal default decision is either ŷ = 1 or
some ŷ ≤ cA. A symmetrical argument applies when f ′(x) ≥ 0.
(ii): The case where f(x) is constant is a subcase of (i). Abstracting from this
case, either f(x) has a strict mode at 12 or an interior modal interval centered on
1
2 . Consider the strict mode. Then f
′(x) ≥ 0 for x < 12 and f
′(x) ≤ 0 for x > 12
with strict inequalities around 12 . It is easily seen that the only possible candidates
for a solution are ŷ ∈ {0, 1} or some interior ŷ such that 12 ∈ [ŷ − cA, ŷ + cB]. The
latter possibility, together with the condition cA + cB ≤ 12 , implies ŷ− cA ≥ 0 and
ŷ + cB ≤ 1. We show that the solution cannot be interior. Suppose the contrary.
Then the expected error cost is
V (ŷ) =
∫ ŷ
ŷ−cA
v(ŷ − x)f(x) dx +
∫ ŷ+cB
ŷ
v(ŷ − x)f(x) dx. (20)
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Without loss of generality, let c := cA ≤ cB. Then
V (ŷ) ≥
∫ ŷ
ŷ−c
v(ŷ − x)f(x) dx +
∫ ŷ+c
ŷ
v(x− ŷ)f(x) dx. (21)
Consider now the optimal policy when both parties have reporting cost c. Denote
the expected error cost by W (y) where y is the default decision. Candidates for a
solution to this problem are y ∈ {0, 1} or y = 12 . In the first case, by symmetry,
both y = 0 or y = 1 yield the same error cost
W (1) =
∫ 1
1−c
v(1− x)f(x) dx
=
∫ c
0
v(z)f(1− z) dz. (22)
In the second case,
W (12) =
∫ 1
2
1
2
−c
v(12 − x)f(x) dx +
∫ 1
2
+c
1
2
v(x− 12)f(x) dx
= 2
∫ 1
2
+c
1
2
v(x− 12)f(x) dx
= 2
∫ c
0
v(z)f(12 + z) dz
where the second equality follows from the symmetry of f . Therefore,
W (12)−W (1) =
∫ c
0
v(z)[2f(12 + z)− f(1− z)] dz.
Now, cA + cB ≤ 12 implies c ≤
1
4 . Because f
′(x) ≤ 0 for all x > 12 , it follows
that f(12 + z) ≥ f(1− z) for all z ∈ [0, c]. Therefore, W (
1
2) > W (1), so y = 1 is a
solution when both parties have the cost c. In the original problem where costs are
cA and cB respectively with cA ≤ cB, it then follows from (21) that V (ŷ) > W (1)
for any interior ŷ. The optimal default decision in the original problem is therefore
ŷ = 1, yielding V (1) = W (1). A similar argument applies in the case of an interior
modal interval.
(iii): When the density has an interior modal interval, f ′(x) > 0 for x in a right-
neighborhood of 0 and f ′(x) < 0 in a left-neighborhood of 1. We refer to this as
Fact 1. If cA+cB≤ mh−ml, then mh−cB> 0. Because f ′(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≤ mh,
it follows from (19) that V ′(ŷ) ≥ 0 for all ŷ ≤ mh−cB. Moreover, using Fact 1,
V ′(0) > 0. Therefore, V (ŷ) > V (0) for ŷ ∈ (0,mh−cB]. A similar argument shows
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that V (ŷ) > V (1) for ŷ ∈ [ml+cA, 1). It follows that V (ŷ) > min[V (0), V (1)] for
ŷ ∈ (0, 1) because ml+cA≤ mh−cB implies (0,mh−cB] ∪ [ml+cA, 1) = (0, 1).
iv): Suppose cA+cB> mh−ml, otherwise condition (iii) applies. It suffices to show
that V (ŷ) ≥ min[V (cA), V (1− cB)] for ŷ ∈ (cA, 1− cB). In the present case,
max (cA,mh−cB) <min (1− cB,ml+cA). (23)
The inequality follows from cA+cB> mh−ml and the assumption cA+cB< 1, given
that we have an interior modal interval. If cA< mh−cB, by an argument similar to
the one used in (iii), it is easily seen that V (ŷ) ≥ V (cA) for ŷ ∈ (cA,mh−cB]. Sim-
ilarly, if 1− cB> ml+cA, then V (ŷ) ≥ V (1− cB) for ŷ ∈ [ml+cA, 1− cB). Thus,
it suffices to show that
V (ŷ) ≥ min[V (max(cA,mh − cB)), V (min(1− cB,ml + cA))] (24)
for ŷ ∈ D := ( max (cA,mh−cB),min (1− cB,ml+cA)). Observe that the result
holds if V (ŷ) is concave and therefore quasiconcave on D. We conclude the proof
by showing that the latter is implied by the condition in the Proposition. For
ŷ ∈ D,
V (ŷ) =
∫ ŷ
ŷ−cA
v(ŷ − x)f(x) dx+
∫ ŷ+cB
ŷ
v(x− ŷ)f(x) dx
=
∫ cA
0
v(z)f(ŷ − z) dz+
∫ cB
0
v(z)f(ŷ + z) dx.
V (ŷ) is concave over D if, for ŷ ∈ D, f(ŷ − z) is concave in ŷ for all z ≤ cA and
f(ŷ + z) is concave in ŷ for all z ≤ cB. But this amounts to condition (iv) in the
proposition. QED
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Table 1. Square-error loss function and Beta priors
Beta Commitment One-sender A Two-sender
(a, b) cB ŷ MSE
(×100)
y∗ MSE
(×100)
y∗ MSE
(×100)
Type
(.5, 1) .10 1 .017 .896 .037* .050 .077 c-B
.15 1 .017 .896 .037*
.075
.116
.896
.213
.207
.037*
c-B
int
c-A
.20 1 .017 .896 .037* .896 .037* c-A
(.5, 2) .10 1 .002 .790 .021* .046 .100 c-B
.15 1 .002 .790 .021*
.068
.141
.736
.260
.219
.024
c-B
int
int
.20 1 .002 .790 .021* .087 .495 c-B
(1, 5) .10 1 .000 .500 .055* .077 .156 c-B
.15 1 .000 .500 .055* .168 .265 int
.20 1 .000 .500 .055* .405 .088 int
(2, 5) .10 1 .000 .562 .097* .207 .148 int
.15 1 .000 .562 .097* .426 .145 int
.20 1 .000 .562 .097* .519 .110 int
(5, 5) .10 1 .001 .664 .188 .500 .148* int
.15 1 .001 .664 .188 .621 .175* int
.20 1 .001 .664 .188 .654 .186* int
(10, 10) .10 1 .000 .570 .296 .500 .189* int
.15 1 .000 .570 .296 .551 .256* int
.20 1 .000 .570 .296* .566 .370 int
Note: cA= .1; a star identifies the smallest MSE over the one and two-sender equilibria.
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Table 2. Symmetric Beta priors and identical costs
Beta Commitment One-sender A Two-sender
(a, b) c ŷ MSE
(×100)
y∗ MSE
(×100)
y∗ MSE
(×100)
Type
(10, 10) .10 1 .00000 .571 .29632 .5 .18958* int
.05 1 .00000 .681 .02022* .5 .02784 int
.02 1 .00000 .832 .00003* .5 .00186 int
(20, 20) .10 1 .00000 .523 .31835 .5 .10880* int
.05 1 .00000 .589 04873 .5 .03731* int
.02 1 .00000 .730 .00009* .5 .00262 int
(30, 30) .10 1 .00000 .511 .27992 .5 .21277* int
.05 1 .00000 .554 .06710 .5 .04319* int
.02 1 .00000 .668 .00031* .5 .00319 int
Note: cA= cB= c; a star identifies the smallest MSE over the one and two-sender equilibria.
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